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I have the honor of welcoming you to 
the Seventy-Third Session of the Institute 
in Santiago de Chile and expressing to all 
of you our gratitude for your attendance 
and for having traveled a not too short 
distance. The very fact that this session 
is being held here is a powerful indica-
tion of how much international law has 
changed in the process of attaining a 
genuine universal reach and participa-
tion in its formation. This is itself the 
product of globalization.
Yet, it is the very process of change 
in the light of globalization that is pos-
ing new and greater challenges to in-
ternational law, a matter which invites 
our reflection and a renewed effort to 
ensure that international society is ef-
fectively governed by the rule of law. 
The Institute has much contributed to 
this effort in the past and it must now 
be prepared to face the needs of the 
present and above all of the future.
Allow me to share with you one over-
all concern that in turn permeates many 
if not most of the characteristics and is-
sues of contemporary international law. 
We have worked for long as individual 
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scholars and as an institution to attain 
the development of international law, 
but doing so in the frame of a rigorous 
scientific and legal approach so as to 
ensure the certainty and predictability of 
rules and the stability of the international 
legal system as a whole. In looking at a 
number of recent and present develop-
ments one can wonder, however, whether 
we have succeeded in our efforts.
It is quite evident that international 
law has changed much and that it must 
continue changing. Yet, does this mean 
that the nature of the legal system has 
changed and that its basic principles 
are no longer the same? There are good 
reasons to believe that this is not really 
the case. Innovation has come hand in 
hand with continuity and the essential 
structure of international law is intact, 
albeit operating in a new and different 
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environment that requires constant 
adaptation. International law is still 
an inter-State system of law which has 
peace, the settlement of disputes and the 
well-being of the individual as its focal 
objectives. This has always been of the 
essence of international law and it must 
be preserved so as to avoid distortions 
that could lead to the opposite result, 
as it has also happened in the past and 
in the present.
This concern is not an abstract one. 
If we consider, for example, the current 
debate about the role of the sources of 
international law we can readily see 
that different schools of thought are 
confronting each other. Treaty-making in 
particular has much changed in the past 
few decades and international organiza-
tions have acquired a meaningful role in 
its preparation, but does this mean, as 
we sometimes hear, that the consent of 
States is no longer required to bring new 
rules of international law into being? Or 
is it true that soft law or other informal 
political arrangements are replacing the 
sanctity of treaties? State consent is still 
essential to this effect, although the man-
ner in which this consent is expressed has 
many new different manifestations. 
Not different is the debate surround-
ing the role of customary international 
law. Is State practice no longer necessary 
or has the passage of time become mean-
ingless? Many qualifications have been 
introduced in the manner how practice 
and time can be ascertained, but none 
points to the abrogation of either. On 
the contrary, if such elements are absent 
anyone anywhere will be able to claim 
that his particular and often interested 
views are customary law, as we have also 
seen in not few governmental claims and 
judicial arguments. This would be quite 
evidently a most destabilizing feature of 
the legal system. Indeed, every passing 
day we hear more about claims that 
what someone likes is jus cogens ir-
respective of the support of such a rule 
by practice and time, just as we increas-
ingly hear that what someone dislikes is 
a crime against humanity. 
General principles of law offer im-
portance guidance in the development 
and application of international law, but 
they are still law subject to strict inter-
pretation standards. Not anything can 
be done in the name of general principles 
as it is sometimes claimed, only what is 
legally permissible. The resort to equity, 
while necessary and convenient in the 
light of circumstances, must be most 
careful and prudent as otherwise the 
legal framework risks to be surpassed 
by peculiar interpretations of which we 
also hear about. The chancellor’s foot 
appears to be growing bigger. If one adds 
to this equation the view that all sorts 
of unilateral acts and decisions of inter-
national organizations are autonomous 
sources of law, Article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice is 
likely to become void of any meaning, as 
some authors unequivocally favor.
It would be wrong to think that 
this debate is circumscribed to the role 
of sources. The application of inter-
national law in domestic legal orders 
offers yet another example. Much has 
changed in this respect too but at no 
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moment could this mean that domestic 
institutions and national law are to be 
ignored. There are rules and processes 
that need to be respected and not just 
anything can be claimed to be the appli-
cable law, particularly when the source 
from which it purportedly originates is 
dubious or tainted by self-interest. 
If we turn to the role of subjects of 
international law we shall find similar 
conceptual confrontations. Is the sov-
ereign State vanishing in the context of 
globalization as we so often hear, or is it 
rather that it is adapting its role to better 
serve the community in such a context? 
The sovereign State is not dissipating 
like fog in a new dawn. It is an essential 
institution to satisfy the interests of the 
community in many respects only that, 
again, it will need to do this in the chang-
ing frame of international cooperation, 
which in turn facilitates the fulfillment 
of such role. International organizations 
are equally essential, precisely because 
they are necessary to attain the objec-
tives of the well-being of society, but they 
are not the State nor they substitute for 
it, not even where the transfer of compe-
tences has taken place in certain specific 
matters. The functions and powers of 
international organizations are derived 
from the State and it is the State that di-
rectly or indirectly sets the limits within 
which such organizations operate.
One could explore many other 
elements of present international law 
and still find the same contrasts. Issues 
concerning the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and the use 
of force, like those relating to immuni-
ties and the exercise of jurisdiction by 
domestic courts under international 
law, the law of the environment and 
its connections with the law of the sea 
or dispute settlement and international 
liability and responsibility, have all been 
the subject of a contemporary debate 
where stability and destabilization of 
the legal order are confronted by oppos-
ing views, some legal, some not.
I have purposefully left for the end 
the role of the individual in internation-
al law. There can be no doubt that the 
individual is the principal concern of 
the international legal order and must 
continue be so, a perspective which has 
become prominent in the development 
of our discipline and our own work 
in different aspects of it. Interestingly, 
this is not a new concern either and has 
been present since the very beginnings 
of international law, with more limited 
manifestations in the past and increas-
ingly larger ones today. 
It is precisely the need to protect the 
individual and ensure its well-being that 
is actively transforming international 
law and offers the most encouraging 
prospects for its future development. 
This has become evident today in re-
spect of the protection of the rights of 
the individual, but it is equally found 
in many other matters, including the 
features of the development of interna-
tional dispute settlement, particularly 
in respect of investments and trade, to 
the point that it would not be surprising 
to see in the not too distant future the 
individual claiming directly before the 
World Trade Organization and other 
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mechanisms closely associated to the 
parallel developments of globalization 
of markets and the economy. Neither 
would it be surprising to see the indi-
vidual before the International Court of 
Justice, as is already there indirectly.
There is, however, a more profound 
expression of the individual as the 
engine shaping the transformation 
of international law and its limits. Is 
international law in risk of becoming 
the new Leviathan, as we have already 
been warned by distinguished writers? 
If treaties are made by interest groups 
irrespective of consent, if customary 
law is whatever anyone wishes it to be, 
if general principles are abused and any 
kind of decision of an international con-
ference is to be regarded as legally valid, 
later to be implemented domestically as 
the law through the interpretation of a 
sympathetic judge or official, the new 
Leviathan would inevitably emerge. 
International law would no longer be 
the rule of law. 
Dramatic as this perspective may 
appear, it is not entirely unreal. We 
already see that when a government 
cannot obtain parliamentary approval 
of a given policy or law, it opts for tak-
ing the matter to some international 
conference or gathering of sorts where 
it shall be solemnly endorsed by some 
resolution, to be followed by the argu-
ment that this is international law that 
must automatically be applied domesti-
cally. Grave distortion of democracy is 
evident in this policy of by-pass, which 
is one of the reasons why parliaments 
are demanding an increased participa-
tion in the formation of international 
law and referendums are being called 
for more often. The paradox of it all 
is that in the name of the individual 
disrespect for its fundamental rights 
are thus enshrined.
Neither it is unreal to realize that 
international organizations are on oc-
casions adopting decisions that inter-
fere with the rights of the individual. 
Thereby the risks are exacerbated if 
unchecked. Paradoxically again, it is 
the vanishing State that will be the 
only entity able to protect the affected 
individual by means of court action, 
of which not few examples are already 
available. 
The test for the vitality of interna-
tional law is whether ultimately we 
believe in the individual, its rights and 
well-being or we do not, however much 
its name is used. If we opt for such 
belief, as we have all done already, the 
limits to the transformation of interna-
tional law will automatically be set and 
the yardstick will ultimately be whether 
they are genuinely compatible with 
such rights and interests and contribute 
to their fulfillment.
On declaring opened the Seventy-
Third Session of the Institute, this is the 
perspective I invite you to share in our 
individual and collective work, so that 
we may achieve the rebalancing of the 
law of nations.
 
 
